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The internet has created enormous global changes.  People can interact with others anyplace, anytime almost instantly.  Much 
of the infrastructure including energy, healthcare, and telecommunications is interconnected globally.  The world has added 
another domain to international conflicts: Cyber War.  In this paper, we explore legal principles which would be involved in a 
cyber attack.  Existing laws of warfare applied in the physical realm do not translate equally as well in the cyber domain.   
Due to the difficulty of attribution, the invisibility of borders and the need to react quickly, we may need to develop legal 
principles that allow immediate and appropriate responses.  This is an area that needs very careful and thoughtful review 
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1. Introduction 
 The internet has created enormous global changes.  People can interact with others anyplace, anytime almost instantly.  
Much information and knowledge is available to anyone with an internet connection and many countries have public 
facilities like cyber cafes or libraries that freely provide that connection.  Much of the infrastructure including energy, 
healthcare, and telecommunications is interconnected globally.  One discipline struggling to deal with the internetted world is 
the law.  In this article, we explore some fundamental legal issues involved in an attack in cyber space.   
In April of 2007, a series of cyber attacks effectively shut down much of the communication infrastructure of the country of 
Estonia.  This was widely reported in the media and often referred to as the “Estonia Cyberwar”.  Most of the attacks were 
distributed denial of service attacks where pings and bots were used to spam websites so that the websites were unable to 
handle the traffic.  The attacks continued for weeks and were more sophisticated than generally used methods.  The “cyber 
war” was sparked by Estonia relocating a Soviet-era memorial and war graves in Tallinn.  Banks, parliament, government 
agencies, and news media were the main targets.  There was no conclusive evidence to link the attacks to the Russian 
Government, although there was speculation that the attacks were government sponsored if not government led. 
A number of cyber events have involved the United States; among these is “Titan Rain,” a series of attacks thought to have 
been initiated by China against several networks including defense contractors, national laboratories, and NASA.  In fact, the 
United States Military and many private companies have multiple daily attacks on their networks ranging from simple spam 
to more serious attacks such as denials of service and installing Trojans, virus, and other malware. 
Our existing laws make a distinction between an attack by a nation state which may be deemed an act of war and an action by 
others which is typically determined to be a criminal action.  The “classification” of the attacker is just one of a number of 
factors which influences what organizations are involved and what rules, laws, and policies are applied. 
 
2. Criminal Acts 
In 2000, McConnell International produced a report which looked at cyber crime and punishment.  They analyzed the current 
state of the law in 52 nations and found that only a small fraction has amended their laws to cover even a majority of the 
different types of cyber crimes that needed to be addressed.  They found that even though there were initiatives underway, a 
great deal of work needed to be done.  They reported that a major problem was the transnational nature of cyberspace.  
“Mechanisms of cooperation across national borders to solve and prosecute crimes are complex and slow.” (McCornnell, 
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2000, p. 1)  Things have not changed much since then and there continue to be major issues if a criminal cyber attack 
involves multiple nations.  Several authors have highlighted the urgency of finding an effective solution. 
 
3. Nation State Acts 
If an attack is determined to be that of a nation state, then another set of laws, rules, and policies applies.   
The United States has well-defined rules of engagement and follows international laws of war in the traditional physical 
domains (e.g., land, sea, air, and space).  The increasing use of information technology has caused a new domain to be added 
- cyber space. 
 
3.1 United States Code Issues 
U.S. Code Title 50 (War and National Defense) put in place restrictions on the intelligence community, all departments of the 
executive branch are required to keep Congress "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities."  The President 
must determine in a written finding that the action has “an identifiable foreign policy or national security objective for the 
United States”.  The President specifies which agencies are authorized to participate in such actions including the military
.
 
Title 50 also applies if the United States is assisting or supplying information to other nations. 
Title 10 of the United States Code (Armed Forces), governs military activities.  In military operations there is no requirement 
to report to Congress.  However, the War Powers Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-148), does require the president to notify 
Congress when forces are deployed and provides that they are to be withdrawn within sixty days  unless there is a formal 
declaration of war by Congress.  This requirement may not apply if the action is categorized as "preparation of the 
battlefield”. 
Thus there are differing requirements depending on how an action is characterized.  “This dichotomy between Title 10 and 
Title 50 presents even more difficult problems when it comes to activities in the cyber world and in space, which are 
increasingly vital to the conduct of military, intelligence, and diplomatic activities.” (Smith, 2007, p 547)  
The United States Air Force is working to address these issues.  In a National Press Club event entitled “Victory in 
Cyberspace,” the commander of the new Cyber Command, Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder recognized the importance of resolving 
the Title 10 and Title 50 issues when conducting operations in cyberspace (Bejtlich 2007).  He also pointed out that while 
operating under Title 32, the Air National Guard may have more latitude to help local governments and commercial and 
private organizations with network defense. The reasoning is that under the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385), federal 
military members and United States National Guard while under federal authority are prohibited from performing in a law 
enforcement capacity within the United States, except where expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress. When not 
in federal service the National Guard is governed by U.S. Code Title 32 (National Guard).  One approach might be to add Air 
National Guard personnel in every state to provide support cyber defense operations.   
  
3.2 The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
The military is required, by policy, to comply with the laws of war in all operations, not just armed conflict. 
“Members of the DoD components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts 
are characterized, and in all other military operations.” Department of Defense Directive (2006) 
The international rules that govern how nations conduct wars are known collectively as the Law of War or The Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC).  The purpose is to minimize suffering and unnecessary damage and to regain peace.  The Law of 
War has developed through a series of conventions, primarily The Hague and Geneva Conventions.  The LOAC requires that 
United States military organizations comply with several principles: 
1. Necessity: only that degree of force required to defeat the enemy is permitted.  In addition, attacks must be 
limited to military objectives whose “nature, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization at the time offers a definite military advantage”; 
2. Distinction or Discrimination: requires distinguishing military objectives from protected civilian objects such as 
places of worship and schools, hospitals, and dwellings; 
3. Proportionality: requires that military action not cause collateral damage which is excessive in light of the 
expected military advantage; 
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4. Humanity: prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force that causes unnecessary suffering; and 
5. Chivalry: requires war to be waged in accordance with widely accepted formalities, such as those defining 
lawful “ruses” (e.g. camouflage and mock troop movements) and unlawful treachery (for example, misusing 
internationally accepted symbols in false surrenders) (Waldrop, 2004). 
 
The interpretation of these principles must be determined on a case by case basis.  In a thoughtful law review article, CDR 
Antolin-Jenkins, a Navy JAG Officer, argues that  international law allows actions if the cyber attack uses force.  It is unclear 
how far a nation would have to go in a cyber attack to fit within this framework.  “Expanding the term "use of force" to 
encompass cyber attacks which constitute economic aggression is likely to have the effect of opening the door widely to 
other acts which the United States has long held constitute permissible acts of influence through economic forces.”  This 
expanded interpretation of “use of force” might have serious unforeseen and unintended consequences.  (Antolin-Jenkin, p. 
21). It is also unclear how these principles would be applied to actions taken against telecommunication, utilities, health care 
systems, and other components of the national infrastructure. 
Another issue that is raised by the law of war is the status of those who work on cyber defense but are not in uniform.  The 
laws of war give specific protections in terms of status to combatants (e.g. prisoner of war status) that may not be afforded to 
civilians.  Generally the rules apply if the person is wearing identifiable uniform and carrying arms openly.  As the U.S. 
military continues to rely more and more on civilians, both government employees and contractors, their status is unclear 
(Turner & Norton, 2001).  Also the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace calls on the private sector to respond to cyber 
threats placing them in an uncertain position. (Hoffman, 2003, p. 421) 
 
4.  Difficulties in Attribution 
The “classification” of the attacker determines whether military involvement is appropriate.  [Depending on who is the 
attacker, where the attack is coming from, what is being attack and how the attack is being carried out, different rules apply.]  
In our current internet society, people share information on a daily basis for all type of purposes.  Criminals are getting more 
sophisticated in the use of information technology.  Criminals without those skills are finding cyber attacks easier to 
accomplish. Hacking tools, with video tutorials on how to use them, are available for free.  “Script Kiddies” or individuals 
with little knowledge can find already written code to accomplish their desired actions.  These attacks can range from simple 
vandalism to coordinated attacks against national infrastructure.  The roles, responsibilities and applicable rules depend upon 
attribution – or the “classification” of the attacker.  Identification of the cyber attack source requires identification of the 
physical location of the attacking system (e.g., tracing the attack back and attributing it to a specific IP address), 
identification of the system(s) controlling the attacking system (in many cases the attacking system is an “agent” of the actual 
attacker), identification of the individuals responsible for initiating the attack, and, possibly, identification of the organization 
that is sponsoring the attack (Denning 2005).  In rare cases, all four of these elements can resolve to a single individual.  
More commonly, each of the four elements is a separate entity, significantly complicating the investigation.   
The need to fuse information from commercial, governmental, intelligence, and military communities often complicates the 
investigation and can add a significant amount of delay.  In an environment where attacks can occur in less than a second, the 
need to be in a position to react and respond in a timely fashion cannot be over emphasized (Robb 2007).  The investigation 
team must understand the political boundaries, cultural factors (differences?), and legal jurisdictions where the attack 
originated, propagated, and targeted.  In many cases, the factor (these factors?) can result in barriers that impede or inhibit the 
investigation.  Even in the best of circumstances, it may be impossible to obtain the information needed to attribute the attack 
quickly enough to enable an immediate response. 
Also, it may be impossible to identify the attacker with any degree of certainty as recent events in Estonia have shown.  The 
attackers could be teenage hackers, criminals, commercial interests, patriots acting to support a country, dissidents within the 
country, terrorists, a nation state or any of these impersonating any of others.  There are private citizens in the United States 
who are monitoring and disrupting Al Qaeda websites.  The hackers group, “The Cult of the Dead Cow”, after the events of 
Sept. 11, offered to assist the government in cyber anti-terrorist incidents.  If actions of this type are deemed to fall under the 
laws of war, the consequences for the individuals and actions taken against them are vastly different than if they are found to 
be criminals (Hoffman, 2003).  Much depends upon attribution, and, in a cyber attack, attribution is not an easy task. 
Determining the location of the attack may be impossible.  A cyber attack may come from hundreds of locations or countries.  
The actor may have taken over “zombies” around the world or on various satellites in space.  Many of these “zombies” might 
not know or even suspect that their servers or computers are involved.  Internet addresses may not determine the location or 
they may be “spoofed” to show false information. Pinpointing the source of the attack may well affect the actions taken to 
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counter the attack. “The Internet is quickly making geographic borders metaphorical. Where actions with legal significance 
consist of streams of electrons taking varying paths among computers all over the world, we need to adjust our laws' 
conception of ’place.’ There are a variety of rules we could adopt to fit events occurring over the Internet into pre-existing 
categories; there are a variety of alternative models we could adopt instead. Some of the conventional models, though, are 
clearly unworkable: We don't now have, and seem unlikely to develop, any way to put border guards between computers 
located in different jurisdictions to examine all of the electrons streaming through. Governments, lawyers, and legal scholars 
are just beginning to think about these questions in a systematic way“  (Litman, 1996).   
It may be impossible to classify the actions:  Most attackers try to hide the true nature of their attacks.  Things that may seem 
to be innocent or a mere annoyance may conceal malware.  Little things done on a large scale may have enormous 
consequences.  “A decade ago, Chinese military theorists like the infamous colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui were 
already hinting at the importance of simultaneously striking multiple infrastructure layers in a confrontation with the U.S.  In 
theory, the breakdown of one system would compound the effects on another, and the crippling of energy, government 
services, communications, the media, and health care and financial systems would interact in a downward spiral” (Peters, 
2007).   
 
5.  U.S Response 
In setting up the Department of Homeland Security, the President established the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.  
The strategy acknowledged that there are a number of roles for the government, but stated that “In general, the private sector 
is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat” (Whitehouse webpage, National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace).  The private sector has been inconsistent on its ability to protect its own interests and assets.  With the 
interconnectedness of the internet, vulnerability for one entity may create problems for other nodes on the network.  
Voluntary, individual, defensive measures on the part of the private sector also will not provide the overall protection needed. 
There are Federal organizations in place to handle cyber attacks.  United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) is responsible for analyzing and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities, disseminating cyber threat warning 
information, and coordinating incident response activities.  National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG), made 
up of 13 Federal agencies, is the principal Federal agency mechanism for cyber incident response. In the event of a nationally 
significant cyber-related incident, the NCRCG will help to coordinate the Federal response, including US-CERT, law 
enforcement, and the intelligence community.    
It is clear, under both international law and national policy, that in a cyber attack on the nation, military components can take 
whatever passive defensive actions needed.  What remain unclear are the active defensive actions or offensive actions that are 
permitted.  Immediately the type and source of the attack must be identified, the proper federal agency must respond in the 
correct manner.  In order for the military to take actions, other than passive defense, it must be determined that the attacker 
was of a nation state.  Otherwise it is a criminal matter and must be handled by law enforcement. 
 
6. Other International Laws 
The recent attacks on Estonia should serve as a wakeup call to all nations to explore the adequacy of the existing United 
Nations (UN) Charter when applied to cyber attacks (Robb 2007).  The world condemnation that a physical attack against 
Estonia would have evoked did not occur in response to a cyber attack.  The UN Charter is most concerned with physical 
attack when compared to diplomatic sanctions or economic boycotts. However, it was not written to address cyber attacks 
where the critical infrastructure of a nation could be attacked in seconds 
There are other treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty, Moon Treaty, and the International Telecommunication Convention 
that also might affect how laws are interpreted regarding cyber attacks but these were either not signed by all of nations, 
including the United States, or were clearly written without the internet in mind. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have identified challenges that would be faced in a cyber attack situation.  Existing laws of warfare applied 
in the physical realm do not translate equally as well in the cyber domain.   Due to the difficulty of attribution, the invisibility 
of borders and the need to react quickly, we may need to develop legal principles that allow immediate response when based 
on good faith or when the defender is in hot pursuit.  This is an area that needs very careful and thoughtful review.  This 
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presentation in this paper is not comprehensive, but should provide the reader some insight into the difficulties that will be 
faced when significant cyber attacks occur. 
 
8. Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force 
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